

Fewer World Visions and More National Spirit Needed Just Now

Huntington Wilson Calls On the Average Citizen to Wake Up and Do More Thinking for Himself Instead of Leaving Everything to Washington

Huntington Wilson is a lawyer by profession, but spent many years in the diplomatic service of the United States. Under two different administrations he served as an Assistant Secretary of State. Through his association with public men and events at Washington and elsewhere he has had abundant opportunity to gather observations concerning the important questions he discusses in the accompanying article.

By HUNTINGTON WILSON.

AMERICAN history has been a long fight against narrow individualism. This individualism must become broader and less selfish and must merge into a vital nationalism.

Only on that foundation can the State become strong, efficient and wise under our institutions. We Americans can have none of the Prussian idea of building a people under the State; we, the people, cooperating as a nation must build the State over, but of ourselves.

Correspondingly our humanitarians might well reflect that the practical way to improve the world is for each nation to improve itself. We seem to have at present a mania for international movements of uplift. They are grand and attractive in the noise they make. But world federation and world peace movements, operating on national units of varying civilizations, characteristics and ideals, are no more likely to bring a world millennium than mere legislation is likely to bring a national millennium.

Under republican institutions we must improve the individual in order to improve the State. Just so in order to improve the world our business is to improve our own nation. The philosophy of our enthusiasts for world movements is singularly Prussian for Americans to indulge in.

At present the "average citizen" leaves everything to Washington, and Washington has its ear to the ground listening for the citizen's opinion. The citizen selfishly attends to his private affairs. Hence a vicious circle and fatuous drift.

We must have leaders, and the voter must wake up and do more thinking and must elect able, unselfish, brave men. Only so can our State become efficient.

Besides the responsible cooperation of individuals for the accomplishment of national purposes it is essential to set free the brains and character of the Southern people in order that they may vote sincerely and by conviction upon national policies. To save America we need the combined devotion of all true Americans. Yet for decades we have performed the incredible folly of allowing a dead issue, the negro question in the South, to bind the brains and character of that great section to traditional voting, quite irresponsible to the real issues of national policy. If the members of the late Progressive party will force the Republican party to discard the negro issue and treat it as a purely local one, in accordance with Mr. Roosevelt's platform, they will perform a wonderful service to the country.

Even in the popular movement for national defence we seem to have half a dozen uncoordinated organizations. All these should be centralized in one agency. It should have branches in every State and considerable town. Some local citizen would be patriotic enough to lend his office in each place for a centre for distributing literature and for the organization of local meetings and for the address on the subject. Through such local agencies the whole national defence movement could make itself felt thoroughly in elections. Without thus bringing pressure upon individual members of Congress and Senators it is doubtful if really good work for national defence can be expected from Washington, where leadership in this regard has been so halting and lukewarm.

One can imagine that in this way there might even grow up a vast patriotic organization of unhyphenated Americans that might be permanent and might in time galvanize our political life, arouse interest in our vital issues and force upon the voters clear and thorough thought upon such issues, and the duty of insisting upon high ability, devotion and unselfishness on the part of their elected representatives.

Without such intellectual cooperation and direct responsibility among the mass of good citizens order cannot be brought out of chaos. In a fusion for efficiency of all the national defence organizations there may even be the germ of a purely American league to further all great national aims.

In many industries we Americans have shown a genius for organization. The peace at any price advocates are organized. The disturbers of industrial peace are organized. Even the criminal class are said to often be organized. Corrupt politics are highly organized.

The way for representative plain American citizens, who are the majority, to have the nation be and act according to its true destiny is for

them also to organize and become the nucleus of a strong, clear thinking nation which automatically evolves a strong and wise State.

The sleeping sickness of our body politic is well shown in our years long

otherwise most assimilable to our citizenship.

There is no more urgent question before the country than that of finding a sound and scientific mode of radically restricting immigration. Yet in this too it is the national folly for the mass of voters to be indifferent and to tolerate floundering drift, procrastination and the craven fear of politicians to offend this or that vote that they need in their own little selfish business.

Vital to our foreign trade, our military safety and our economic welfare is the revival of our merchant marine,

disappear in this case from every half reasonable mind? The merchant marine legislation of this Administration is a joke, and it will be a treason of national folly if the voters do not take interest enough to laugh it down.

Again, national folly has not been better exemplified than in the whimsical drift which has been called a "policy" toward Mexico, and in the deliberate destruction of our position in China. Then there was the insincere assault upon "dollar diplomacy," which was simply a sensible policy of endeavoring to create economic interests which should support revolution, for instance, in Central America; of creating in China a community of interests among the great Powers which should deter any one or two from assaulting Chinese sovereignty or restricting equality of commercial opportunity.

An axiom of "dollar diplomacy" was that the American Government ought to "lend all proper support to legiti-

world visions and more concentration upon the interests of our own country, which is the only one we need consider, would be of more use to the nation—and of greater practical benefit to the world.

The conduct of foreign affairs is a field in which the responsibility of national folly rests prominently upon officials, because the American people scarcely yet realize the real importance of our diplomatic policies to their honor, their safety and their business. The diplomacy of the present Administration has generally been transcendent and visionary where it should have been practical, vacillating and procrastinating where it should have been decided and prompt, blustering where it should have been cautious, shallow and opportunistic where it should have been founded in deep statesmanship, obstinate where it should have been conciliatory.

The archives have been stuffed with the dangerous and foolish Bryan arbitration treaties which protect us from nothing, expose us to danger and insult and hamper our rightful influence. The European war gaucherie has exhibited us as caring for nothing but dollars and as too timid or undecided to make a real stand on nearly every occasion when humanity, usage and law alike justified America's making her voice heard for the right. "Watchful Waiting" has become a worldwide joke. Lord Elgin, once wrote of the Chinese how disgraceful it was to deal with a people "who yield nothing to reason and everything to force." This Administration has consistently denied either to poor Mexico! And now they recognize Carranza.

We hear of no guarantees except for Catholic interests. So far, so good; but what of the thousands of Americans despoiled and maltreated in Mexico? Are they ignored because unorganized? Logic is sought in vain in this "policy" (1).

Yet a real policy could readily enough have been devised. For example, we might settle up Mexico, hold its ports and perhaps its northern States, and collect its customs and pay from those funds all equitable damages to Americans and other foreigners, and also our expenses. (Otherwise Mexico will try to evade payment under the international law doctrine of "act of God" or "damages," being uncollectable.)

Meanwhile, in the course of time, Mexico might learn to behave and part of the forcible measures could perhaps be relaxed. We should, however, make no promises to restore places occupied by these questions for ultimate consideration.

Such a course would avoid the wholesale penetration and pacification of a vast country which the latest shift in recognizing Carranza does not at all appear to remove from the field of probability. Some such clear policy, if announced in advance in an ultimatum, might even bring sobriety to Mexico in a month or two.

But why cite a type of anything that might be constructive and sound in foreign policy? This Administration seems to have adopted the "manana" spirit, maybe as a delicate compliment to the new form of cynicism, called Pan-Americanism. Unfortunately "manana" is not all it is necessary to learn about Latin America and Indian America.

This Administration seems bent on wrongheaded shilly shilly in our foreign relations, as if it were its proud mission to express in ineptitude the national folly which holds the mass of Americans so perilously indifferent to these things. And the Democratic party in its last campaign book actually had the effrontery to boast of its diplomacy!

Since there appears no great Democratic revolt against the inefficiency and drift that now characterize the care of nearly all our vital interests one need not be a partisan to turn for hope to the Republican party. But it too will need the whip of public opinion. A careless and thoughtless electorate will never merit a good government.

If the Republican party fails at the proper time to liberate the brains and character of the truly American South by a declaration on the negro question there or fails to have constructive modern ideas beyond the old "full dinner pail," or fails at Chicago to put up as a candidate a safe and really big man, untainted alike by reactionism and by wild-eyed Bull Mooseism, it will lose a wonderful opportunity.

There will be a test in the coming campaign as to whether the views of selfish individualism are to determine things, or whether wise and sincere cooperation for the national good shall triumph over national folly. Loose thinking, half baked dogmas, prejudice and lack of coordination among the citizens will only give a new lease of life to national ineptitude and sentimentalism, under whatever party it be.

imate and beneficial American enterprises abroad." Every phase of "dollar diplomacy" was calculated to rebound to the advantage of American commerce, industry, influence and prestige.

In some respects it has now been appropriated and applied, rather insincerely and under new names, as for example in Hayti and Nicaragua. But generally speaking under the present dispensation it has seemed to be thought rather shameful to work quite frankly for purely American interests. Strange view! Less of

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shilly-shilly over the immigration question. If we do not restrict immigration now the typical American will become as nearly extinct as the Indian, the original unhyphenated inhabitant.

What satisfaction is there in building up in the United States a wonderful material inheritance if we care not what kind of a nation is to inherit it? The idea that America should become a dumping ground and an asylum for all mankind is a played out piece of rank sentimentalism.

Patriotism will degenerate to a mere sentiment for the soil if instead of a nation we become an international crazy quilt. We have received immigration beyond the safe limits of assimilation and with utter carelessness of adaptability to the truly American type.

Most Americans have thought this for years, and American labor has properly demanded that the influx cease in order that the standard of life of our labor shall be maintained. Then Congress labored and brought forth the literacy test! Whether we are to be swamped by European goods or by European immigration after the war is debatable. The latter would be more tragic than the former.

We ought to prohibit practically all labor immigration for a generation. This exception might be made: The national Executive might be permitted to contract on behalf of State governments for bodies of immigrants to be distributed where needed, especially in rural districts, for a term of years.

The law should transfer to the ports of departure the examination of immigrants and should create scientific administrative machinery such that there should only be admitted to the United States races of easy assimilability and individuals of good physique and free from defective taint. Advantage should be taken also in legislation of the fact that economic, social and racial fitness for American citizenship coincide in the same classes of immigrants; that is to say, foreigners now getting in their own countries wages most nearly approximating American standards are also those

yet look at the silly La Follette bill, killing our baby merchant marine. Look at the ship purchase bill, an old Bryan idea.

It is true that we must have more and more paternalism to mitigate to the individual the rigors of modern industrialism, to distribute more equitably the "social surplus," to protect the whole nation against selfish group interests; but why should State socialism go to sea first? The best way to get an American merchant marine would be for the Government to guarantee a net profit of, say, 3 or 4 per cent. to purely American capital invested in ships approved as to quality and availability as transports or naval auxiliaries, as to trade routes and as to naval reserve personnel by the proper departments of our Government. Mr. La Follette's very excellent aim to improve conditions of life for American seamen—and we need concern ourselves only with them—could then be administratively carried out.

By tariff and other measures we uphold the standard of life of other American workers, and the whole nation pays for this national benefit in taxes and in higher prices. Why in shipping only, where foreign competitors are all subsidized, shall it be the investor in shipping alone who pays?

With woful insincerity the public has been led to associate "subsidy" with predatory "trusts." Now financial greed will not run after 3 or 4 per cent. If the Government guarantee that, then patriotic capital will go in, where it will not now go into shipping with the clear prospect of losing money. Yet capital in shipping will of course try to make a higher profit. If it does so the Government pays out nothing.

In regard to the bill for Government owned ships, besides being a silly and uncalled for fantasy in State socialism, it has many clear disadvantages. Every little shipping controversy becomes an international issue. Every old tub becomes in international law a "public vessel." Government operation is notoriously extravagant, yet the taxpayer who does not want to pay a "subsidy" is invited to pay the undoubtedly larger deficit of Government operation for the same service.

We must have a merchant marine. The only objection to straight subsidy is the fear of financial "privilege." If we extend the privilege of making 2 per cent. guaranteed profit in return for a service demanded by commerce, national safety and national patriotism, does not the "subsidy" prejudice

Shall Nation Depend Upon the States for Its Defence?

Henry Breckinridge Says That It Is Impossible to Build Satisfactory System Upon the Militia

The House of Representatives rejected last week the Senate's proposal to increase the regular army to 250,000 men and also voted against the Senate's plan for a volunteer army. In speaking against the latter proposition Representative Hay said that the United States could not have both a volunteer army and the National Guard, as the Senate proposed.

This brings up the question of the availability of the National Guard as the foundation for a new scheme of national defence. The objections to it are stated by Henry Breckinridge, formerly Assistant Secretary of War, in the following article, which is the seventh in the series on preparedness written by him for THE SUNDAY SUN. He asserts among other things that under this plan there would be created forty-eight separate State armies, while the need is for unity of action. The result, he believes, would be a farce, if not a scandal.

By HENRY BRECKINRIDGE, Formerly Assistant Secretary of War.

WE have considered some of the fundamental principles necessitating the provision of armed forces for the national defence and have skimmed the surface in consideration of how extensive that armed force should be. We have seen the necessity for the division of the national defence into its component elements of sea power and land power and the further necessity of the division of the essential land power into coast artillery and mobile army.

Now it is profitable that we consider somewhat the foundation upon which we must build the organization of the land forces.

The technical aspect of organization is a matter repellent to the normal lay mind. The average man is satisfied when he knows what is to be the bulk of the national defence. He is not interested in how this bulk is organized. Yet throughout all the field of national defence organization is of equal importance with bulk. A hundred dreadsoughts are not a fleet. A navy must consist of all the essential elements—dreadnoughts, battleships, cruisers, scouts, destroyers, submarines, colliers, hospital ships, ammunition ships, repair ships, aircraft and whatever other elements are essential in naval warfare.

I do not pretend to have any other than a lay knowledge of the subject. But whatever elements go to make up a proper navy, each element must be existent therein and must exist in its proper proportion, else there is not a well rounded navy.

So with the army. The three essentials of a proper army as far as personnel is concerned are numbers, organization and training, and the organization must be correct just as the training must be correct or the result is inadequate and defective. It is a question which is the most useless in war, an organized army of untrained men or a mob of trained men. There is one special phase of this problem of organization of which I wish to speak now.

We have heard a great deal in recent months of the controversy concerning the militia or National Guard and the so-called continental army. To call the discussion a controversy between the supporters of the militia and the supporters of the continental army of I may be so held as to use a plural noun with respect to the support given to the continental army idea during recent months is to state a superficial phase without discerning the fundamental issue.

The fundamental issue is whether the land forces of the national defence shall

be built upon a national foundation, upon a national army, or whether they shall be constituted of forty-eight State armies subsidized by the Federal Government. The only reason this issue has not been settled is because it has not been understood. The American public has not concerned itself about military affairs until after the outbreak of the world war and therefore it has been necessary that it go to school in the primary grades to learn something of the vast subject.

First the problem was to teach the public that we must no longer remain impotent, as impotence must lead to disaster. That has been fairly well accomplished. Then it was necessary to commence a very tedious process of disseminating the most elementary information concerning the problems of defence, which are as simple as the A B Cs to the average western European. I have talked with many an ex-private of a European army now domiciled in the United States who could talk with much more intelligence about military organization than most highly educated Americans. But when this issue is understood by the people it will be settled right.

In the multitude of counsellors there is wisdom, but there is bad executive action. Executive efficiency requires despatch and despatch in administration requires unity of authority and unity of responsibility. The successful waging of war requires the very incarnation of executive efficiency. The very elementary foundation of military organization and military discipline is unity of authority and unity of responsibility.

Now when the Constitution of the United States was established our fathers were endeavoring to transform a confederacy into a nation. Under the old confederation each State was sovereign. Under the Constitution the States retain certain powers. Nearly all the police power, the responsibility for law and order, remained vested in the State. The States had maintained militia before and, as Colonies, had done likewise. Control over the State militia was still remitted to the States by the Constitution.

There was great jealousy of standing armies in the Constitutional Convention, but the good sense of that convention nevertheless saw that the safety of the nation depended upon giving the national Government the utmost power of raising and maintaining the means of national defence. So the Constitution provided for two classes of troops—national troops for national purposes and State troops for State purposes.

The States were forbidden to maintain troops without the consent of Congress. Congress was empowered to provide for the calling out of the

militia of the several States for certain specified purposes, to wit: to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection and to repel invasion. Congress could prescribe the organization and discipline, but in the States were reserved the appointment of officers and the authority for training the militia in accordance with the discipline prescribed by Congress. In other words, the doctor could prescribe, but it was up to the patient as to whether or not he would take the prescription. And there is the point that forever makes it impossible to build a system of national defence upon the State militia. And it is absurd from any standpoint.

The Constitution makes it the duty of the national Government to guarantee to the States a republican form of government, to protect the States from invasion, to come to the assistance of the States whenever the ordinary agencies of government within the States are no longer able to maintain law and order. The function of the national Government, among other things, is to protect the States. It is nowhere intimated or contemplated in a single instance that the States should protect the nation, that the parts should take the whole under their wing.

It is absolutely absurd to contend that the States should defend the nation. It is the business, and the exclusive business, of the nation to defend the nation. It is well enough and logical that if the States have within their jurisdiction certain militia or less dependable troops for State purposes in time of war these troops might be used for what they are worth. But the mere statement of the proposition that such troops should be the main reliance or any serious reliance for the defence of the nation in war exclusively demonstrates the utter lack of that proposition. You can find some of the people all of the time and all the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time. Genuses in sophistry and political legerdemain succeeded pretty well for a time in making a good many people believe that the pea was under the shell where it wasn't.

They would put it under the control of the War Department and make it available to the national Government, both in peace and in war, for every legitimate purpose of national defence. Like the malignant and proverbial druggist, they would give the people something just as good. But it will not work.


Whatever else the American people may be they are not fools. Not one of the advocates of State ports against national defence contended against the fundamental principle of the necessity of the unification of control of the national defence. But they would do so, by the expenditure of so many million dollars, the State militia could be increased to 350,000 men, and by making the payment of this money to the States dependent upon this and that, they would make a veritable national army.

A hollow imposture! The Constitution of the United States tells clearly exactly what it can do and what cannot do with respect to the State militia. With all the millions of public treasury the Congress cannot purchase or bribe one vestige of State authority denied to it by the Constitution. The Governors can and do appoint the officers. The President of the United States in time of war cannot give one legitimate order to a member of the State militia. In time of war the President of the United States cannot order one State militia man outside the borders of the United States. In time of war the President has the power to draft the militia in time of peace, which power is denied him and the Congress by the Constitution. Forty-eight armies, forty-eight commanders in chief in persons of forty-eight Governors, forty-eight State Adjutants-General, appointed in majority of instances for political reasons! All Federal means, all training to be sifted through the State Adjutants-General to the militia; the Governor to appoint all the officers through the Adjutant-General and with each appointment a salary in some of the States of the time the result would be a gigantic political machine; in some of the States of the Union, an honest effort to do the best that could be done. As a general rule, a farce, if not a scandal. Far better that nothing should be done than that the American people be deceived into a false security, resting upon broken reed planned in a quicksand.

Forty-eight armies for the national defence! Let us be logical. Let us have forty-eight navies; each State with its navy and the Governor the grand admiral of the fleet. Let us take out from the control of the national Government the conduct of foreign affairs and set up forty-eight State Departments in the States of the Union, so that our foreign affairs may be brought closer to the people, each State direct its relations with foreign countries according to its conditions and needs. Let us have forty-eight Postmasters-General, one for each State. Be comely and assured, we can arrange a proper cooperation between them and perhaps develop some uniform standard of conduct which all the forty-eight State Departments would adhere to of pure good feeling and patriotism. Let each State coin its own money. Let each State chart its own course. Let each State build its own harbors, dredge its own rivers, erect State customs tariffs.

Certainly none of these matters of more importance than the national defence. Certainly there is no need for unity of action by the nation with respect to any one of these matters, if there is not that same unity of action by the nation in the preparation for and the conduct of war, upon which will depend the life of the nation. Politics, far from imposture—they stand between the nation and its safety. Hasten the annihilation of the impulse of selfishness that will sweep them away. Let us trample them down the same old road.

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A phase of modern defence. Motor trucks equipped with detachable rims to run on rails.